The recent New York Times investigation into the deadly 2012 attack on the
U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi has reignited the debate over the nature
and trajectory of al Qaeda. The conclusion of the report – that there was no
evidence of an al Qaeda role in the attack – reinforces our view that the
organization that attacked the United States more than 12 years ago is in
decline. But it also serves as a reminder that the threat has not disappeared.
Rather, it is morphing into a new, more dispersed, less predictable, but still
lethal enemy
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
showed al Qaeda at its deadliest. At the same time, though, 9/11 also
represented the beginning of al Qaeda’s decline as an organized terror
enterprise that would ultimately lead to its emergence as a decentralized,
factious amalgam of freelance groups, each with its own methods and agenda.
This new organization may lack the infrastructure to plan and carry out attacks
like the one that occurred in Benghazi (and certainly attacks like 9/11), but
today’s al Qaeda remains a threat to strike where and when it can and to fan
the flames of extremism.
The decade that followed the 9/11 attack saw the gradual
decline of bin Laden’s core al Qaeda. The architects of 9/11 were largely
killed or detained, the remnants were in hiding in Pakistan, and the
revolutionary message had lost ground globally in the face of relentless al
Qaeda killings of Muslims across the Islamic world. Some of its most promising
potential successors experienced similar declines, from Jemaah Islamiyya in
Indonesia to al-Shabaab in Somalia, along with al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia
and Europe.
But what of the current generation of Salafist militants –
the offspring of bin Laden’s al Qaeda? For them, the signs may not be so bleak.
Though they may lack the organizational structure, the focus on attacking the
West and the charismatic leadership of yesterday’s al Qaeda killers, today’s
militants do not lack its homicidal audacity. Or its wide reach.
Affiliated groups have risen across the Middle East and
South Asia and into Africa and Europe. Homegrown plots have emerged in the
United States in Europe, carried out by individuals zealously donning the al
Qaeda mantle, even with little or no contact with terror networks. And the
killing hasn’t stopped. Indeed, in many areas of the Middle East, murder in al
Qaeda’s name is sharply increasing. In Iraq, Shia are being murdered at a
shocking rate. In Pakistan, Shia are frequent targets and across the Middle
East groups inspired by bin Laden’s old message continue to sacrifice innocents
– from mall shoppers in Kenya and a teacher in Benghazi, to students in Nigeria
and oil workers in Algeria. These are the victims of the new breed of al Qaeda
terrorists.
So we have conflicting trends. In broad strategic terms, al
Qaeda is diminished. Numerous acts of terror against the United States have
been prevented. It is clear that the American homeland is safer than it was,
and it’s hard to conceive of a 9/11-style attack occurring today. At the same
time, though, this emerging generation of militants poses its own threat to
regional stability. We would be remiss if we assumed this jihadi phoenix
could never rise again to threaten American cities.
America’s attention span tends to be shorter than that of
its adversaries. Americans may evaluate the changing terror landscape as they
would the NASDAQ stock exchange, defining success by watching swings over a
month or even a year. For al Qaeda, success is something that is defined over
decades, or even centuries.
Looking at the landscape through this lens might yield a
different picture, one that offers hope to the current generation of Salafist
extremists. From this perspective, the al Qaeda cause has endured even as the
post-9/11 years brought setbacks to its leadership, its globalist message, and
many of its affiliates and adherents. But periodic attacks – London, Bali, and
even Ft. Hood, Texas – meant the decline was not a linear downward slope.
The United States has reason to worry, as Sen. Dianne
Feinstein (D-Calif.) Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), the chairs of the Senate and
House Intelligence Committees, pointed out recently. Events in the region – the
unremitting violence in Syria, the collapse of any authority in Libya, and the
continued instability and infighting in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere – appear
to be emboldening al Qaeda sympathizers. Instability in Syria has opened the
door for al Qaedists to broaden their sway among oppositionists, and
instability in Iraq – and potentially Lebanon – offers further opportunities
for radical jihadis.
There are too many breeding grounds. While much of today’s
violence is localized – Yemeni extremists are interested in Yemen,
Somalis in Somalia, and Syrians in Syria – any of these hot spots could
become the next launching ground for a resurgence of anti-western targeting.
Neither the inevitable decline of al Qaedism nor the rise of disparate al
Qaedist groups in Africa and the Middle East is a full picture, though, and
frequent assessments and reassessments might suggest that the al Qaeda
phenomenon is morphing more quickly than it actually is.
At the same time, the United States can take some comfort in
the progress that has been made at home – in the knowledge that a concerted and
consistent counterterrorism campaign has made the country safer and largely
eliminated the scourge that hatched the 9/11 plot. Because the al Qaeda
revolutionary ideology is so resonant and resilient, the United States should
be cautious about translating this comfort into a judgment that it is out of
the woods. The picture is neither as positive as it looked even two years ago,
nor as bleak as alarmists suggest.
Terror leaders with a target horizon that reaches Europe and
the United States are uncommon. Carrying out successful plots against the West
requires stout leadership, loyal and focused operatives, and a safe haven to
plan without diverting attention to more immediate battles against local
security services, other competing groups, or U.S. drones. At the moment, the
al Qaeda offshoots do not possess these assets, and America is safer because of
that.
At the same time, though, the United States must not allow
this fragile sense of security to become complacency. The terrorist threat is
still there, morphing over time from local or regional threats to international
conspiracies and back again. Measuring progress threat- by-threat, or month by
month, would lead to the mistaken belief that tactical gains or losses
represent major shifts in this long, painful counterterror campaign. The
campaign is a marathon run against a slowly declining revolutionary idea, al
Qaedism, which will take many more years to stamp out fully.
The United States should not lose sight of the fact that
while 12 years of counterterrorism efforts have helped keep it safe, many more
years of vigilance lie ahead. Measuring progress in a counterterrorism war
against the al Qaeda group may be straightforward; measuring progress against
the morphing idea of al Qaedism isn’t.
By Andrew Liepman
and Philip Mudd, Special to CNN
Editor’s note: Andrew Liepman is a former principal deputy
director of the National Counterterrorism Center and a senior policy analyst at
the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Philip Mudd, former Senior
Intelligence Advisor at the FBI and Deputy Director of the CIA Counterterrorist
Center, is the director of Global Risk at SouthernSun Asset Management.
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