Myanmar's constitution, under which the
current administration of President Thein Sein was created in 2011, has all the
characteristics of a modern republic, but regime opponents see the continued
autonomy of the army -- and its political role -- as anomalies. The result has
been faltering efforts to amend the constitution, many of them aimed at
reducing the role of the military before elections are held later this year.
Despite the army's
still-pervasive power, the speed and thoroughness of the transition from
military authoritarian rule to a system with most, if not all, the features
expected of a "democratic" system have surprised many observers and
analysts. They see the transformation in the country as being driven by forces
outside the historical experience and understanding of the armed forces
leadership. A closer reading of the country's politics since 1988 reveals that
the army had a long-term plan to achieve the kind of reforms we are seeing
today, laid out far in advance but discounted by most outside observers and
political opponents of the military.
Protector
of the state
It is in the history of the armed forces and
their role in protecting the state from threats to its internal security,
territorial integrity and external security that the basis of the
transformation can be found. The army, with its roots in the Burma Independence
Army founded under Japanese auspices in 1941, sees itself as the protector of
the state. Arguing that past interventions were essential to resolve political
crises that threatened unity and territorial integrity, the military now sees
its role as that of a "balancer," or stabilizing force, in the face
of an unknown future. Ensuring the continued viability of the armed forces and
the security of its leadership is an ongoing concern for the officer corps.
The 20 years between the
1990 general election, won by the opposition National League for Democracy led
by Aung San Suu Kyi but subsequently annulled by the junta, and the 2010
general election, boycotted by the NLD and won by the military-backed Union
Solidarity and Development Party, were spent by the armed forces creating the
conditions that enabled the transition from military to constitutional rule.
The process was organized
like a military campaign, with the element of surprise and perpetuation of
control the uppermost priorities. The army did a very poor job of explaining
its intentions. This made it difficult for the military's opponents, both at
home and abroad, to understand its strategy and tactics, especially in the
light of its reputation for brutality -- notably in putting down
anti-government demonstrations in 1988.
The army's view of
post-independence history is that, on several occasions, it has had to
intervene to re-establish political order -- the 1948-52 civil war, the 1958-60
caretaker government, the 1962 coup amid the Cold War and separatist pressures,
and the 1988 bankruptcy of the economy. As a result, it argues that it has a
duty to continue to serve as a "balance" to ensure the continued
stability and effectiveness of the government.
Until Myanmar's military
is assured that the new republican order can function in a manner that does not
threaten territorial integrity, security and stability, it will insist on
maintaining its autonomous role while developing its capacity to function as a
modern professional armed force.
The army leadership is
thus closely scrutinizing the evolving political scene. Only when it feels
confident that future elections will result in stable governments that can
manage the country's fissiparous politics will it start to relinquish control.
The current chorus of demands by students, monks, minority religious leaders,
indigenous groups and international nongovernmental organizations for the
government to resolve longstanding problems -- as well as the recurrence of
armed conflict with ethnic groups seeking autonomy on Myanmar's northern border
-- create the kinds of political chaos that previous elected governments
attempted to appease. The demands were unacceptable to the army and the result
was not peace.
Plausible
vs. impossible promises
Given how Myanmar's military leadership
understands its role in history, the formation of an acceptable government
after the 2015 elections and ongoing efforts to reach a political settlement
with numerous ethnic insurgent groups will determine the speed and degree to
which the army allows its autonomous role to be undermined or terminated.
Political party leaders
in the brief period of democracy, after the end of British colonial rule in
1948, promised the impossible. In the runup to the 2015 elections, they will
have to walk a fine line between what the army will accept and plausible
promises to a public that has, perhaps, excessively high expectations.
If they promise the
impossible, the army leadership may decide that the political order is not yet
mature enough to allow it to lessen its grip. Only the army can end its own
role in Myanmar's politics, and that decision is dependent on its perception of
the civilian political elite's ability to manage the future.
Robert Taylor is a visiting professorial
research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and
author of the forthcoming "General Ne Win: A Political Biography."
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