Friday, October 20, 2017

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Rising sectarian tensions, the turf war between th...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Rising sectarian tensions, the turf war between th...: Rising sectarian tensions, the turf war between the military and the police and political corruption to dog Indonesian Progress We d...

Rising sectarian tensions, the turf war between the military and the police and political corruption to dog Indonesian Progress



Rising sectarian tensions, the turf war between the military and the police and political corruption to dog Indonesian Progress

We do not have to look far to understand the problems of bureaucratic reform in the country. The Indonesian word for government is pemerintah, a modification of the word perintah, which means to order. So it is within the mindset of the Indonesian people that the job of the government is to order, a practice that was perfected by Javanese kings and queens who spoke to their subjects only to demand loyalty and tributes.

For centuries, this common practice continued to persist until modern times. The New Order regime of president Soeharto further refined the practice by using the bureaucracy to collect rent from businesses, in the process creating a massive system of kleptocracy.

The downfall of the Soeharto regime ushered in a bureaucratic reform, which was an attempt to free the government from corruption, collusion and nepotism. Every administration in the post-Soeharto era tried to undertake the reform, with the latest attempt carried out by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who in his second term listed bureaucratic reform as his administration’s top priority in the Long-Term National Development Plan 2010-2025. The progress, however, has been very slow. Corruption continues to run rampant while the process of dealing with the bureaucracy remains a complicated one.

The administration of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, which will enter its third year today, has also declared bureaucratic reform its number one priority. He started off by campaigning on what he termed revolusi mental(mental revolution), which is aimed at transforming the culture of priyayi (privileged class) in the bureaucracy from one that demands service to one that delivers it.

While serving as mayor of Surakarta, Jokowi streamlined the bureaucracy by introducing a one-stop service for business licensing, a service he wanted to replicate at the national level.

In three years of his administration, Jokowi has unveiled 16 reform packages, most of which deal with deregulation and bureaucratic reform. There is reason to believe that the current reform could work, simply because Jokowi is the type of leader who demands results. The reason he travels so frequently around the country is because he wants to see progress being made firsthand.

Jokowi also has no qualms about publicly scolding government officials who fall short of their expectations. Earlier this week, the mayor of Medan, Dzulmi Eldin, issued a public apology after Jokowi scolded him for failing to fix pothole-filled roads in the North Sumatra capital.

Symbolically, Jokowi has made steps to bring a friendly face to the government. He gives out bikes to people who provide the correct answers to his quizzes and drops by at youth-oriented music concerts, which has burnished his image as a leader who is close to the people.

Rising sectarian tensions, the turf war between the military and the police and political corruption may continue to dog his performance, but, fundamentally, things are moving in the right direction.

Jakarta Post

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Islamic mobilisation and oligarchy in Jakarta

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Islamic mobilisation and oligarchy in Jakarta: Islamic mobilisation and oligarchy in Jakarta The past year or so has seen conspicuous setbacks to Indonesian democracy’s capacity to...

Islamic mobilisation and oligarchy in Jakarta


Islamic mobilisation and oligarchy in Jakarta

The past year or so has seen conspicuous setbacks to Indonesian democracy’s capacity to protect many social rights, including of some of the more vulnerable members of society—most notably women, religious and sexual minorities, and victims of the 1965–66 mass killings. Ironically, this has occurred under a government whose declared agenda of extending access to social services has been a celebrated and defining characteristic, not to mention the presumption that its establishment had deflected a prior possible reassertion of authoritarian-like politics.

By 2015, a wide-ranging survey had offered the proposition that Indonesia’s hard-won democracy had stagnated. However, many of the more sombre assessments of this condition were to come in the wake of the second round of the Jakarta gubernatorial election in April 2017, and the farcical blasphemy case that saw the defeated Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (“Ahok”) sentenced to jail. The mood of these analyses could not be more different from the upbeat tone that characterised those that immediately followed the victory of Ahok’s close ally Jokowi over Prabowo Subianto in the 2014 election. That result had spared most Australia-based analysts—and many of the people of Indonesia—from the pain of having to contend with what might have been an overwhelmingly clear signal of democratic regression.

But the manner of Ahok’s downfall is merely symptomatic of much deeper problems within Indonesia democracy, which have never been resolved since the fall of Soeharto. These problems are intertwined with continuing oligarchic dominance and the manner in which intra-oligarchic conflict now occurs. The mobilisation of identity politics has become a more salient feature of conflicts over power and resources. In fact, we may be entering a new phase in which conservative takes on Islamic morality, and the hyper-nationalism which is being positioned against them, become the most important cultural resource pools from which the ideational aspects of intra-oligarchic struggles are forged—thus accentuating the illiberalism of Indonesian democracy. Indeed, the relative absence of organised social forces that would drive an agenda of liberal political reform is more palpable than ever before.

Islamic mobilisation and oligarchy in Jakarta

The race for the Jakarta governorship provided some of the best indications of how continuing oligarchic domination relates to the growing prominence of the illiberal characteristics of Indonesian democracy. Undoubtedly the most socially divisive local election in Indonesian history, it was even more hotly contested than the 2014 presidential contest, which was already considered exceptionally polarising by a number of analysts.

Ahok had been widely regarded as an able governor. But his fateful words about the Koranic verse Al Maidah 51 came to position him, effectively, as the co-author of his own political demise. The mass mobilisations against him combined calls for Islamic solidarity with a familiar narrative about the systematic marginalisation of the ummah. This narrative has been long entwined in Indonesian modern history with the perception that Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese minority has disproportionately benefitted from preferential economic treatment since colonial times. One irony, of course, is that these anti-Ahok demonstrations appeared to be supported by the children of Soeharto, whereas it was their father’s own New Order regime that had been responsible for nurturing the giant ethnic Chinese-owned conglomerates in Indonesia in the first place by providing them with political and economic protection. The implication of members of that family in the protests indicated that matters of oligarchic conflict were far from being entirely separated from the events surrounding the fall of Ahok.

The two most widely discussed interpretations of Ahok’s defear have been provided by Ian Wilson and by Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. Wilson has emphasised how Ahok had created antipathy among the poor residents of Jakarta, mainly by pursuing urban rejuvenation projects that involved the eradication of entire slums. Mietzner and Muhtadi, however, argue that Ahok’s loss was more plainly related to religion: an aversion among many voters to back a non-Muslim and the belief that the governor had indeed committed blasphemy against Islam. Neither explanation is completely dismissive of social-economic issues on the one hand, or religious identity issues on the other—so there is little point in accusing either side of being unaware of the interrelatedness of the matters at hand.

But a somewhat different—though not necessarily incongruous—interpretation would place his defeat more firmly within the evolution and mechanics of broader conflicts within Indonesia’s oligarchy. All three candidates in the first round of the Jakarta polls had essentially served as proxies for competing coalitions of entrenched elites. Ahok represented the ruling coalition driven by the PDI-P. Anies Baswedan competed as the candidate of a bloc led by Prabowo’s Gerindra Party. And it is difficult not to construe Agus Yudhoyono’s sudden foray into the political arena, necessitating the abandonment of a promising military career, as anything less than an attempt to forge a political dynasty on the part of his father, SBY, founder and leader of the Democratic Party.

If this sort of interpretation has any merit, Ahok’s defeat in the face of FPI-led mobilisations was less an indication of the inexorable rise of Islamic radicalism in Indonesian politics than of the ability of oligarchic elites to deploy the social agents of Islamic politics for their own interests. The broader implication is that radical expressions of Islamic identity—which go together with rigidly conservative interpretations of Islamic morality championed by the FPI and similarly hard line groups—are being increasingly nurtured and refashioned within the present requirements of oligarchic politics.

In fact, by facilitating expressions of frustration by many ordinary citizens through the use of a predominantly religious-tinged political lexicon, Indonesian oligarchic elites have all but ensured that Indonesian Islamic politics would move increasingly toward a conservative direction. Moreover, it is instructive that the resultant social and political conservatism is being mainstreamed with the aid of oligarchic elites who would not be normally considered the social agents of Islamic politics.

In the aftermath of the Jakarta election, many took to warning that it signalled the rise of such religious extremism, which presents an immediate threat to Indonesia’s pluralist social fabric and to its internationally praised democracy. In a way, such fears represent a revisit of older concerns, expressed during the early years of reformasi, that democracy would result in the political ascendancy of Islamic radicalism, which had supposedly been suppressed only because of the iron-fisted rule of Soeharto. Indeed, Indonesians who tend towards secular forms of democratic politics should be aware, now more so than ever, of the historical and contemporary weakness of politically liberal (or social democratic) streams within Indonesian politics.

The hyper-nationalist reaction

Given the long absence of Leftist traditions as well from the scene—since the violent destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1960s—it has become increasingly clear that the most durable bulwarks against hard line Islamic politics are to be found within strains of nationalist politics. The problem for Indonesian democracy is that these strains are typically entwined with social interests embedded within the apparatus of the state, including the military, that have been more historically concerned with social control than social representation.

This point is crucial in understanding the significance of Jokowi’s response to the newly-assertive Islamic mobilisation. It is expected that the same tactics of mobilising identity politics against Ahok will be employed against him, though perhaps in not exactly the same manner or degree of effectiveness. There is already much rumour-mongering in social media about Jokowi’s personal background and history that casts Indonesia’s president as a closet ethnic Chinese communist. In spite of their somewhat fantastical nature, it is apparent that the president himself has become quite concerned about the swirling rumours surrounding his identity. At the very least, he has become sufficiently irked to deliver an irate rebuttal and to describe them as nothing less than a politically-motivated attack on his character.

In policy terms, Jokowi’s main reaction has been to deter such rumours by promoting the cultural symbols associated with Indonesian nationalism. He has done this, for instance, by way of initiating a new national holiday—Pancasila Day—on 1 June. The sanctity of the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI), based on the founding idea of “unity in diversity”, has been emphasised quite conspicuously as well in his speeches and public comments since Ahok’s defeat. He has even vowed to demolish organisations that are anti-Pancasila, in the kind of forceful terms that would not have been out of place in the heyday of the New Order.

It is not surprising that the president has felt compelled to deliver a response designed, at least in part, to buoy those Indonesian citizens who would be wary of a democracy that unwittingly opened the door for the ascendancy of conservative Islamic morality. There is some delightful irony in the fact that FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab has been investigated by the police for an indiscretion prosecutable under a wide-ranging anti-pornography law, which his organisation had heavily supported at its inception. This is the case even if political liberals should possess awareness that the pornography law is essentially as inane—from the point of view of democratic rights—as the blasphemy law that had brought down Ahok.

Nevertheless, banning the FPI altogether carries political risks for a president expecting to be attacked on the basis of his own questioned Islamic credentials. Instead, Jokowi landed a symbolic blow on an Islamist enemy via the Perppu (regulation in lieu of law) enacted in July 2017. This decree paved the way for the government to ban, without judicial process, organisations deemed to be undesirable, with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) being the first target as expected. As part of the ban, university lecturers who are known to be members of the organisation have been threatened with expulsion from their jobs, giving rise to fears of a broader government instigated witch hunt. Even critics of Islamic hard line groups have warned that the government is embarking on an anti-democratic “slippery slope”.

The bigger picture: oligarchy, Islam, nationalism?

The political dynamics being witnessed speak to larger points about how oligarchic power has had the capacity to change in relation to new circumstances, and therefore, to evolve. As the Indonesian oligarchy is much more decentralised in nature today than during the pinnacle of the New Order, competition among its factions over power and resources has taken place largely via the institutions of democratic governance. It is in the context of such contests that appeals to conservative ideals of morality—whether Islamic or nationalist—may become a more entrenched rather than just fleeting feature of Indonesian democracy. This is because such appeals have the potential to connect otherwise detached oligarchic elites to broader bases of social support, by at least temporarily obscuring actual divisions within Indonesian society through moral appeals, but without being linked to any kind of agenda of transformation of the way in which power is constituted.

As I and other scholars have argued, the New Order-nurtured oligarchy reinvented itself in the course of the struggle over the direction of reformasi. It did so by colonising the institutions of Indonesian democracy—its parties, parliaments and elections. This was assisted, in turn, by the endemic and systematic disorganisation of civil society sustained by decades of rigid and often brutal authoritarian rule. The consequence was that social forces effectively representing politically liberal or social democratic alternatives were almost nowhere to be seen in the crucial early years following the fall of Soeharto. Leftist ones had of course been long obliterated.

As discussed above, the primary form of pushback to the rigid and inflexible Islamic conservatism has been a similarly retrogressive hyper-nationalism, which references the inviolability of the Indonesian Unitary State (NKRI) and the state ideology, Pancasila. This is so even if that state ideology has proven to be quite pliable throughout modern Indonesian political history, utilised somewhat differently (in different contexts) by presidents Soekarno and Soeharto. Indicative of the basically retrogressive nature of this response is a new proposed arrangement by the Minister of Home Affairs whereby the rectors of Indonesian universities would be chosen by the president, as a means of ensuring that Islamic radicalism does not grow unabated in university campuses due to tacit support from some within the higher ranks of academia. Of course, the problem with such an arrangement is quite similar to the one surrounding Perppu No. 2 2017; it could be used potentially to stamp out other kinds of “threatening” ideas in the future, such as those connected even to mainstream political liberalism. Already, university students have been warned by a military luminary of the dangers of “liberalism, communism, socialism and religious radicalism”, all of which he facilely categorised under “materialist ideology”.

In other words, it is not hard to imagine that the establishment of hyper-nationalist barriers to Islamic radicalism will have quite authoritarian effects, certainly in the medium to longer term. It also encourages rigid conformity to a set of values and ideas—in this case associated with rigidly organic-statist definitions of Pancasila rather than to a religion—to which democracy activists were opposed during much of the New Order period. Among these was the notion of society where the pursuit of self-interest was supposed to be contained by a state embodying the common interest—but which in fact helped to insulate a particularly predatory form of capitalism from potential challenges emanating from civil society. In line with this sort of development has been the promotion of the Unit Kerja Pembinaan Pancasila (Work Unit for the Cultivation of Pancasila), which presents an eerie reminder of New Order-style so-called P4 courses, wherein people from all walks of life used to be indoctrinated to the state ideology through mind numbing mandatory classes. Yet embarking on similar exercises is now somehow accepted by many as a progressive step, rather than a nod to the intrinsic conservatism and suffocating insularity of earlier organic-statist tendencies in Indonesian political thought and practice.

Long-time democracy activists in Indonesia will find it particularly disconcerting that present circumstances have made it so easy for the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) to declare—and not for the first time—that democracy contradicted the principles of the state ideology of Pancasila. It goes without saying that the general concerned, Gatot Nurmantyo, was not lamenting the prevalence of money politics or oligarchic domination. Instead he was lambasting the actual practice of voting, which in his view, inhibited another practice—that of consensus-building—deemed more in keeping with an essentialised notion of what constitutes an authentic Indonesian culture. Though not surprising given its source, these kinds of comments inevitably bring back uncomfortable memories of the suffocating nature of New Order political discourse, which frequently quelled dissent by labelling it as inherently “foreign” or un-Indonesian. In fact, there is a real danger that liberal—let alone more Leftist critiques of the way that power is constituted in post-Soeharto Indonesia—will be increasingly susceptible to a similar kind of labelling, whether by reference to the sanctity of the values of Pancasila or those considered to be of divine origin.

The new populist currents

One final point needs to be made. This relates to the increasingly attractive idea that populist politics has come to make its mark on Indonesian democracy. There has been much discussion of the rise of populism in Indonesia since the 2014 presidential elections—from authors such as Ed Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, William Case, and myself with Richard Robison—in which the two candidates were widely seen to be making use of populist rhetoric. But apart from the “outsider” status claimed by both, which has been one focus of attention, a major characteristic of populism is that it attempts to “suspend” difference, albeit temporarily, among sections of society to bring them behind a particular political project. In other words, there is a penchant within populism for supposing homogeneity in the face of actually growing social heterogeneity, largely by juxtaposing the fate of the many and pure against that of the few and morally corrupt.

References to members of an ummah who have in common the experience of systemic marginalisation since colonial times, can form the ideational basis of an Islamic form of populism, whereby the downtrodden and pious are juxtaposed against rapacious elites.  But given the organisational incoherence of Islamic populism in Indonesia, the binding of people to Islamic vehicles is less achieved by maintaining their loyalty—for example through the provision of material benefits by way of access to social services, as has been the case in parts of the Middle East—but through continuous efforts to sustain controversy.

Nationalist forms of populism, which are more conventional in the global sense, relatedly aim to define a “people” who are the repository of virtue as well, in contrast to evil and rapacious elites, including foreign ones. In Indonesia, it is sustained in part by reference to supposedly authentic and immutable cultural values that allegedly value harmony, which may become under siege by a range of influences, including potentially that of radical forms of Islamic politics.

What we may be effectively witnessing in Indonesia is therefore a newer phase within which political conflict increasingly relies on the employment of different variations (and combinations) of religious and nationalist forms of populism, and where political liberalism and Leftist critiques are effectively as side-lined as they had been in the authoritarian New Order.

 

Indeed, in the case of Indonesia, social groups that had been assumed—especially within the paradigm of modernisation theory and its associated more recent and sophisticated manifestations—to be the harbingers of socially and politically liberal values have in fact never displayed such a sociological characteristic very strongly. Richard Robison had already emphasised the conservatism of the Indonesian middle class and bourgeoisie of the 1990s, developing as they had within an authoritarian social order where the fear of uncontrolled mass politics was systematically cultivated. Thus, in dubbing Jokowi the “middle class president”, Jacqui Baker is reminding us that the president’s “illiberal tendencies… are not qualities of the man per se, but symptomatic of the Indonesian middle class and the unique political conditions under which it was formed”.

Some of this conservativism, reshaped within a new social and political context, is now being expressed through world views sustained by references to Islamic morality or hyper-nationalism. These can be linked to ways of asserting modes of political inclusion and exclusion that are detrimental to the rights of the more vulnerable members of Indonesian society. Significantly, the process of further political illiberalisation is being facilitated no less than by the evolving imperatives of oligarchic domination and the mechanics of intra-oligarchic competition over power and resources within Indonesian democracy—something for which there is no obvious institutional remedy.

…………………………

This an adapted version of the author’s paper presented at the 2017 Indonesia Update conference at the Australian National University, which will be published in full in the December edition of the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies.

Vedi Hadiz is Professor of Asian Studies and Deputy Director at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne. An Indonesian national, he received his PhD at Murdoch University in 1996. His research is in the broad areas of political economy and political sociology and covers Indonesia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Among his books are Islamic populism in Indonesia and the Middle East (Cambridge University Press 2016), Localising power in Indonesia: a Southeast Asia perspective (Stanford University Press 2010) and, with Richard Robison, Reorganising power in Indonesia: the politics of oligarchy in an age of markets (Routledge 2004).

Thursday, October 19, 2017

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: What’s Next for Indonesia-Vietnam Defense Ties?

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: What’s Next for Indonesia-Vietnam Defense Ties?:   Last week, the defense ministers from Indonesia and Vietnam led their respective delegations for another round of their bilateral d...

What’s Next for Indonesia-Vietnam Defense Ties?


 

Last week, the defense ministers from Indonesia and Vietnam led their respective delegations for another round of their bilateral defense meeting held in Jakarta. The meeting saw both sides discuss broader regional and global security issues as well as take stock of their bilateral defense cooperation, including outlining future steps for cooperation through the signing of a new joint vision statement out to 2022.

As Indonesia-Vietnam relations have developed over the years, from a comprehensive partnership agreement signed in 2003 to a strategic partnership in 2013, the two countries have also looked to make progress in the security domain as well. Recent defense dialogues have focused on further steps to implement their memorandum of understanding inked in 2010, efforts to develop defense ties more generally including joint exercises, dialogues, and military equipment, and means to better manage challenges, including the treatment of fishermen amid some recent clashes at sea.

Last year was an active year for defense ties, with Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu making his first Vietnam visit since assuming his position and then-General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong making a trip to Indonesia – the first by a Party chief since the late Ho Chi Minh in 1959 and the first by a top Vietnamese leader since the inking of the 2013 strategic partnership. Though the focus of his visit, which included a meeting with Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, was on the relationship more generally, there were some defense-related developments including the signing of a letter of intent on cooperation between their two coast guards.


This time around, Vietnam Defense Minister Gen. Ngo Xuan Lich was in Jakarta to meet with several top Indonesian officials, including Ryacudu for their defense meeting on October 13. During the meeting, both sides discussed the broader regional and global challenges they both confront, including terrorism, cybercrimes, human and drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and the South China Sea issue. Ryacudu in particular emphasized the fact that none of these challenges could be confronted alone and required partnership among regional states.

The two sides also discussed thornier issues, most notably managing their maritime boundaries amid some recent clashes at sea as both concluding negotiations on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones. This has been an ongoing issue that has factored into their recent engagements even though it often is not as widely publicized in official accounts by the two sides as much as other areas of convergence.

They also reviewed the existing infrastructure of the bilateral defense relationship, agreeing to continue the joint working group for their armed forces and the implementation of a defense policy dialogue into 2018. They noted areas for future progress such as education and training and defense industrial cooperation. Both sides also inked a joint vision statement to guide the overall defense relationship out to 2022. That was both a notable step in the institutionalization of the defense relationship and yet another indicator of the emphasis they are placing on security ties as being a pillar of the broader Indonesia-Vietnam strategic partnership.

By Prashanth Parameswaran for The Diplomat

Wednesday, October 18, 2017

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Indonesia, Russia Ink Defense Protocol Amid Fighte...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Indonesia, Russia Ink Defense Protocol Amid Fighte...:   Indonesia and Russia held the latest iteration of their talks on military technical cooperation. The dialogue, which saw the signin...

Indonesia, Russia Ink Defense Protocol Amid Fighter Jet Deal


 

Indonesia and Russia held the latest iteration of their talks on military technical cooperation. The dialogue, which saw the signing of a protocol agreement, comes as both sides consider ways to further boost their defense collaboration even as they manage existing challenges.

As I have noted before, as Indonesia modernizes its military, Russia, currently Jakarta’s largest military supplier, has obviously been part of the conversation. But though both sides have been mulling several deals as well as broader advances in defense cooperation over the past few years, they have also had to factor in their priorities, which on the Indonesian side includes a greater insistence on developing its domestic defense industry.

From October 10 to October 11, the two countries held the thirteenth iteration of their talks on military technical cooperation (MTC). During the talks, officials as well as defense industry representatives from both sides discussed several issues, including areas of potential cooperation as well as overcoming challenges.

Unsurprisingly, one of the areas of focus was how to ensure that ongoing defense collaboration between the two countries is in line with Indonesia’s existing procurement laws and its policy objective of developing its domestic defense industry. Indonesia’s Law 16 specifies that offsets, local content, and countertrade should be worth no less than 85 percent of the value of the contract, with local content making up no less than 35 percent of this.

One outcome from the meeting, the Indonesian defense ministry disclosed in a statement released thereafter, was the inking of a draft protocol. The agreement, Indonesian defense officials said, would facilitate not only the purchase of defense equipment from Russia, but also the strengthening of broader defense ties including areas like joint development and joint production as well as maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) through technology transfers.

The military-technical agreement comes as both countries continue to make progress toward the inking of a long-mulled Indonesian purchase of Sukhoi Su-35 multirole combat aircraft. As I have noted repeatedly, the deal has faced repeated delays since Indonesian defense minister Ryamizard Ryacudu first announced Indonesia had decided to buy the aircraft in September 2015, including over procurement regulations (See: “Why is the Indonesia-Russia Fighter Jet Deal Still On Hold?”).

As of now, though Indonesia is not expected to build the aircraft or parts of it by itself, both sides have been working out the structure of the deal to include MRO, countertrade, and offset opportunities, including Indonesian export of commodities and defense products. Though specifics are still being negotiated, Indonesian officials have previously said that, within the $1.14 billion expected deal for 11 Sukhoi jets, around $570 million will be paid for in Indonesian commodity exports such as palm oil, tea, and coffee, with around $400 million sourced through an offset program, and the remaining paid for through cash.

Thus far, Russia, which is eager to make further inroads in the defense realm in key Asian markets, has been willing to factor in Indonesia’s domestic priorities into the discussion. This pattern continued at the dialogue held last week with the Sukhoi deal still on the horizon, with the latest date of finalization set by Indonesian officials as November.

By Prashanth Parameswaran for The Diplomat

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Jakarta’s new governor doubles down on identity - ...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Jakarta’s new governor doubles down on identity - ...: Jakarta’s new governor doubles down on identity - the  pribumi /non- pribumi  cleavage is alive and well in Indonesian politics, and a l...

Jakarta’s new governor doubles down on identity - the pribumi/non-pribumi cleavage is alive and well in Indonesian politics, and a leading politician is betting that exploiting this cleavage is good politics


Jakarta’s new governor doubles down on identity - the pribumi/non-pribumi cleavage is alive and well in Indonesian politics, and a leading politician is betting that exploiting this cleavage is good politics

 

Jakarta’s new governor, Anies Baswedan, was inaugurated in a large and highly publicised ceremony on 16 October. After a highly racially and religiously charged gubernatorial campaign that saw Anies defeat incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—a Chinese Christian since imprisoned on charges of blasphemy—many Indonesians had hoped for a period of calm. Anies might have contributed to that by delivering a moderately religious but clearly nationalist and inclusivist inauguration address in his first speech as governor.

This is not what he delivered. Instead, Anies has doubled down on the identitarian religious rhetoric that sustained his campaign and propelled him into office. One particular line from his speech as attracted particular attention among Indonesia’s liberals, progressives, and religious and ethnic minorities:

Jakarta ini satu dari sedikit, satu dari sedikit kota di Indonesia yang merasakan kolonialisme dari dekat. Penjajahan di depan mata itu di jakarta, selama ratusan tahun. Di tempat lain mungkin penjajahan terasa jauh, tapi di Jakarta bagi orang Jakarta yang namanya kolonialisme itu di depan mata. Dirasakan sehari-hari. Karena itu bila kita merdeka maka janji-janji itu harus terlunaskan bagi warga Jakarta. Dulu kita semua pribumi ditindas dan dikalahkan. Kini telah merdeka, kini saatnya menjadi tuan rumah di negeri sendiri. Jangan sampai Jakarta ini seperti yang dituliskan pepatah Madura: etek se bertelor, ajam se rameh, katanya. Itik yang bertelur, ayam yang mengerami. Kita yang bekerja keras untuk merebut kemerdekaan. Kita yang bekerja keras untuk mengusir kolonialisme. Kita semua harus merasakan manfaat kemerdekaan di ibu kota ini.

Jakarta was one of only a few cities in Indonesia that felt colonialism from up close. Colonisation was in front of one’s eyes in Jakarta, for hundreds of years. In other places, perhaps, colonisation felt far away, but for the people of Jakarta colonialism was right in front of their eyes. It was felt on a daily basis. Because of that, when we became independent, those promises [of independence, as Anies mentioned earlier: namely prosperity, protection, and knowledge—Ed.] had to be fulfilled for citizens of Jakarta. Previously, all of us pribumi [indigenous people] were oppressed and defeated. Today we are independent, and it’s time to become the hosts in our own country. Don’t let Jakarta like what is written in the Madurese saying: etek se bertelor, ajam se rameh. The duck lays the eggs, but the chicken broods. It was we who worked hard to contest independence. We who worked hard to drive out colonialism. We all have to feel the benefits of independence in this capital city.

There are three important observations from this excerpt.

  1. Even after nearly seventy years of independence, colonial legacies matter. Anies is able to compose a powerful political message that invokes the socioeconomic effects of colonialism. Anies (or his speechwriters) believe that this is message that still resonates. In my view, he is right.
  2. This is a presidential speech, not a gubernatorial one. The looks exactly like the speech of a candidate preparing himself for a 2019 presidential run, placing Jakarta at the centre of national politics and staking a claim for himself as a national politician. Elsewhere in the speech he invokes folksy sayings from ethnic groups around the archipelago (Acehnese, Batak, Banjar, Madurese, Minahasa, Minang), figuratively pushing a pin in each of Indonesia’s regions and saying “I am speaking to you too.”
  3. Every Indonesian who hears this speech will understand that it is targeting ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Specifically, it is associating Chinese Indonesians with the long colonial period and its legacies on everyday politics. Pribumi is a term that connotes indigeneity, but specifically, it identifies those citizens of Indonesia who are viewed to be descended from foreign populations (Chinese, Arabs, Indians, Europeans, and others). Anies appears to have conveniently forgot that he himself is of Hadrami descent. Alternatively, he might not have forgotten at all, but rather he knows that Indonesia’s wealthy Arab Indonesian elite faces none of the discrimination that Chinese Indonesians face in places like Jakarta. The visual imagery surrounding Anies’s installation reflects similar kinds of politics. One notable banner that has generated much discussion appears below:

The long term consequences of this for Jakarta and Indonesian politics are hard to predict. However, anyone hoping that Anies would revert to the moderate Islamic persona that he had cultivated prior to his gubernatorial campaign must now be disappointed. His lickspittles might argue that his use of non-Muslim religious language at the beginning and end of his speech signals his understanding that Jakarta (like Indonesia) is a religiously diverse city. But this view ignores the reality of Anies’s inauguration: the pribumi/non-pribumi cleavage is alive and well in Indonesian politics, and a leading politician is betting that exploiting this cleavage is good politics.

…………………………

Tom Pepinsky is an associate professor in the government department and a faculty member of the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University. He studies comparative politics and political economy, with a focus on emerging market economies in Southeast Asia.

 

Monday, October 16, 2017

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Suharto: A Declassified Documentar Obit from the N...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Suharto: A Declassified Documentar Obit from the N...: Suharto: A Declassified Documentary Obit National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 242   ...

Suharto: A Declassified Documentar Obit from the National Security Archives


Suharto: A Declassified
Documentary Obit
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 242

 




Washington, DC, January 28, 2008 - As Indonesia buries the ex-dictator Suharto, who died Sunday at the age of 86, the National Security Archive today posted a selection of declassified U.S. documents detailing his record of repression and corruption, and the long-standing U.S. support for his regime.
The documents include transcripts of meetings with Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, as well as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Vice-President Walter Mondale, then Vice-President George H. W. Bush, and former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.
Additional documents detail U.S. perceptions of Suharto from the earliest years of his violent rule, including the 1969 annexation of West Papua, the 1975 invasion of East Timor, and the so-called “Mysterious Killings” of 1983-1984.
“In death Suharto has escaped justice both in Indonesia and East Timor,” said Brad Simpson, who directs the Archive's Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project. “But these declassified documents, detailing the long record of U.S. support for one of the twentieth century’s most brutal and corrupt men, will contribute to our understanding both of Suharto’s rule and of the U.S. support which helped make it possible."
Most of the documents posted today have been declassified as a result of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed by the Archive, in addition to documents unearthed in the National Archives (NARA) and Presidential libraries.
In the coming weeks the Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project will be posting additional documents concerning the events leading up to Suharto’s downfall in May 1998.
Read the Documents
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Initial Report on Suharto
This National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA at the end of 1968 offers a positive portrait of Suharto and the New Order regime he had assembled following his ouster of Sukarno in March 1966 and consolidation of control in the intervening months. Just 18 months after the bloody massacres involving the murder of between 500,000 and one million alleged supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party, the NIE states that “the Suharto government provides Indonesia with a relatively moderate leadership.” The estimate reports, “There is no force in Indonesia today that can effectively challenge the army's position, notwithstanding the fact that the Suharto government uses a fairly light hand in wielding the instruments of power. Over the next three to five years, it is unlikely that any threat to the internal security of Indonesia will develop that the military cannot contain; the army--presumably led by Suharto--will almost certainly retain control of the government during this period.”

Suharto's Meetings With U.S. Officials
National security adviser Henry Kissinger briefs President Nixon on his upcoming visit to Indonesia and likely conversations with Indonesian President Suharto. Kissinger argues that there is no U.S. interest in getting involved in the issue of West Irian and that its people will choose integration with Indonesia. In Nixon's talking points, Kissinger urges that the President refrain from raising the issue except to note U.S. sympathy with Indonesia's concerns.
Suharto made his first visit as head of state to the U.S. in May 1970. The trip came amidst a major crackdown on political parties in Indonesia aimed at insuring the dominance of the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (GOLKAR) and the Army in parliamentary elections scheduled for 1971, as well as detailed revelations of pervasive corruption among government and military officials including smuggling, bribery, kickbacks and nepotism. Privately the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta warned that the corruption and authoritarianism of the New Order would progressively undermine its rule even as it eliminated or co-opted its opponents. Publicly, however, the White House fairly gushed over the state of relations with Jakarta and the Suharto regime’s performance, viewing the trip as a chance to strengthen its already cozy ties with the Indonesian dictator (who must have been surprised to learn that he presided over one of the “largest democratic countries in the world”). “There are no issues between the U.S. and Indonesia,” Henry Kissinger wrote the President approvingly, “and relations are excellent.” Suharto was offering to help support the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government in Cambodia, the regime continued to welcome American investors and pursue a “pragmatic” five year development plan, and Indonesia was increasingly identifying with U.S. regional goals as the Administration began its inexorable drawdown in South Vietnam. “What Suharto has done and is doing accords perfectly with your concept of Asian responsibilities under the Nixon Doctrine,” the national security advisor observed.
Memorandum of Conversation, President Suharto of Indonesia, The President, Dr. Kissinger, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272
In his meeting with President Nixon, Suharto frankly admits to having “nullified the strength” of the Indonesian Communist Party, an apparent reference to the mass killings of alleged PKI members, and states that “tens of thousands” of its members “have been interrogated and placed in detention.” President Nixon largely confines himself to questions and supportive statements concerning U.S. support for the Suharto regime. Over the course of Suharto’s two-day visit, the White House reassures Indonesian officials of their continued commitment to Southeast Asia and pledges to increase military aid to $18 million to enable Indonesia to purchase 15,000 M-16 rifles to replace the AK-47s it is covertly sending to Cambodia to assist the Lon Nol government which recently overthrew the government of Prince Sihanouk.
Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford, President Suharto, Dr. Kissinger, et al., July 5, 1975
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, July 5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto

This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Camp David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor. Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d'horizon of East Asian political issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international investment, and Portuguese decolonization. Suharto brought up the question of Portuguese decolonization in East Timor proclaiming his support for “self-determination” but also dismissing independence as unviable: “So the only way is to integrate [East Timor] into Indonesia.” Ford gives no response.
U.S. Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, December 6, 1975 [Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion]
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3, Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76
On the eve of Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. For more than a year the U.S. had known that Indonesia was planning to forcibly annex East Timor, having followed intelligence reports of armed attacks by Indonesian forces for nearly two months. Thus, Ford or Kissinger could not have been too surprised when, in the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in Thailand and Malaysia, Suharto suddenly brought up East Timor. “We want your understanding,” Suharto stated, “if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.”
Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: “We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have.” Kissinger did indeed stress that “the use of US-made arms could create problems,” but then added that, “It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation.” Thus, Kissinger’s concern was not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively—and hence illegally—but whether the act would actually be interpreted as such—a process he clearly intended to manipulate. In any case, Kissinger added: “It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly.”
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s visit to Jakarta in April 1977 and his lengthy meeting with President Suharto was the first by a high-ranking Carter Administration official.  The visit occurred during the run-up to tightly-controlled Presidential and parliamentary elections in which hundreds of Suharto opponents had been arrested and critical newspapers shuttered.  It thus represented, in the words of the U.S. Embassy, an “unusual opportunity” to advance concerns about human rights and democracy more generally - had that been Holbrooke’s intention.  In his meeting with Suharto, however, the Assistant Secretary offered no criticism of Indonesia’s human rights record while “acknowledging efforts President Suharto appeared to be making to resolve Indonesian problems,” especially on  East Timor, where he “applauded” the President’s judgment in allowing Congressional members to visit the territory but remained mute on reports of ongoing atrocities.  Suharto responded that Indonesia did “not seek to hide anything” in East Timor – at a time when journalists and relief organizations were banned and visitors allowed only under military escort.
Memorandum for the President from the Vice President, "Visit to the Pacific," April 26, 1978
Source: NSA Staff Materials, Far East Files, Box 7, Carter Library
From May 9 to May 10, 1978,Vice President Walter Mondale visited Indonesia as part of a larger regional visit and the Carter Administration's initiative to "deepen relations" with the Suharto regime. This Memo for President Carter requested his approval for Mondale's policy goals for the trip, including the expedited delivery of sixteen A-4 fighter jets to Indonesia, which was then preparing for a massive campaign of aerial bombardment of East Timor in an effort to crush armed resistance to its occupation of the territory. Mondale's briefing memo makes no mention of East Timor.
In a May 10 meeting with Indonesian President Suharto, Mondale noted that Indonesia's 1977 release of thousands of political detainees had "helped create a favorable climate of opinion in the Congress" for expanded American arms sales. He suggested to Suharto that releasing prisoners more regularly would further improve public opinion and deflect criticism - a suggestion the regime later implemented. The Vice President likewise noted the two nations' "mutual concerns regarding East Timor," in particular "how to handle public relations aspects of the problem." As with the problem of political detainees, Mondale suggested that allowing humanitarian groups such as Catholic Relief Services access to East Timor would not only help refugees in the area (overwhelmingly generated by Indonesian military operations) but "have a beneficial impact on U.S. public opinion."
In October 1982 Suharto came to the U.S. on an official state visit, the highest honor accorded visiting dignitaries.  The briefing papers and summary of Suharto’s plenary session with President Reagan are most notable for what they do not contain – a single mention of human rights in Indonesia or East Timor.  The visit offers striking reminder of the degree to which the Reagan Administration abandoned any high level concern about human rights in Indonesia through the 1980s.
In August 1983 East Timorese guerrillas attacked Indonesian military forces at the airport in Dili, killing 18 soldiers. In response to the attack, and as part of a larger military offensive involving 10,000-12,000 troops, Indonesian soldiers carried out several large massacres: of 200-300 civilians near the town of Viqueque, and at least 500 civilians in villages near Mount Bibileu. These two lengthy cables describe those operations and the breakdown of the ceasefire which preceded it, and fits a persistent pattern lasting from 1975 to 1999 in which U.S. Embassy officials expressed skepticism over the scale or even the existence of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor. In the second cable, the embassy officer repeats the claim, apparently from an Indonesian source (whose identity is excised), of several hundred killed near Viqueque.
In May, 1984 Vice President George H. W. Bush visited Indonesia as part of a longer trip that included stops in Japan and South Asia. The briefing papers prepared for Vice President Bush highlight the continued focus on commercial and security relations over considerations of human rights.  In 1984 the U.S. provided $45 million in credits for foreign military sales (FMS) and $2.5 million in International Military and Educational Training (IMET), “our second largest IMET program worldwide.”  Vice-President Bush’s political scene setter notes that “political activity in Indonesia is tightly controlled,” with “no organized political activity” between national elections and opposition forces “dispirited and incapable for the foreseeable future of mounting a direct challenge to his power.”
Vice President Bush’s visit came on the heels of a major Indonesian military offensive in East Timor in which hundreds of civilians were massacred and in the midst of a period of severe repression in Indonesia punctuated by “a government-organized campaign of summary killings of alleged violent criminals” known as the “mysterious killings,” which began in late 1982 and continued through 1984.  The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta estimated that the government had summarily executed about 4,000 people, with continued killings reported.
In his meeting with Suharto, however, Bush, like Reagan and previous high-ranking U.S. officials, offered nothing but praise for the dictator, assuring him that “our relations with Indonesia are most significant and that we derived great satisfaction from our relations with Jakarta.”  As with Suharto’s 1982 visit to the U.S., there was no mention of human rights, and discussion focused largely on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Suharto and Corruption
Memo from David Gunning from Peter Flanning, Weyerhauser Company – Indonesia Problems, December 5, 1972
Source: Nixon White House Central Files, Subject File, Country File Indonesia, Box 37
U.S. officials were aware from the start of the deeply entrenched corruption of the Suharto regime.  This memorandum outlines the sort of protection rackets the Suharto regime offered to foreign investors as the cost of doing business in Indonesia.  It details an arrangement that the Weyerhaeuser Company (one of the world’s largest timber companies) made with the Army for a timber concession in Borneo, offering the Army “a 35% interest in the concession at no cost in order to insure government cooperation.”   Weyerhaeuser officials express concern that “this arrangement has not provided the protection which was expected” and that “disconnected actions by disparate army officers and civil servants” in addition to the Army’s rake-off are threatening the company’s profitable operations.
This lengthy telegram describes the mounting concern with corruption voiced by the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a donor consortium established in 1967 to coordinate foreign aid to Indonesia. It describes “increased, though fragmentary information of widespread and growing corruption” and “the consensus of all informed observers that scale is large and growing, that it involves highest echelons in government, and that this in turn is causing it to spread and deepen in all branches of social and economic life.”
Memo from Carleton Brower to the Ambassador, What Happened While You Were Away, August 10, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
These two memos describe Suharto’s personal intervention in a timber concession in Kalimantan being sought after by the International Paper Company. The head of IPC stated that “the matter was of the most extreme sensitivity; that Suharto would brook no interference.” The second memo describes how, after complex notions involving IPC and the Indonesian government, “Suharto and his people were talking over the entire concession for their own profit.”
In unusually blunt language, the memo describes Suharto’s purported plan: “three dummy corporations, one headed by his half-brother, one by his son, and one by the notorious Bob Hasan group, will reportedly exploit the concession. The memos seem to show that Suharto and his colleagues in this enterprise are totally uninterested in proper timber management or development of a wood processing industry and are intending only to rape the concession for maximum short term profit.” [Note: The memos summarized by these documents were not included in the lot file box at the U.S. National Archives.]